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preference for, and the ownership structure of, a joint venture depend on the efficiency of
information gathering and of cost reduction, and on the nature of credit markets. We find,
inter alia, that when the credit constraint is severe the MNC does not push the domestic
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firm never makes it better off and in fact makes the domestic firm worse off when the credit
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1 Introduction
Foreign direct investment (FDI) takes place for a number of reasons, and it taking the form
of an international joint venture (IJV) can have many motives. Similarly, a domestic firm’s
willingness to join an IJV with a multinational corporation (MNC) has several purposes.
In this paper we focus on only a few of these motives for both partners of an IJV. For the
domestic firm, better information about a foreign market and access to improved production
technology are the two key motives that we consider in this paper. As for the MNC reduced
competition and reduction in set-up costs of production are the focus of attention here.1
It should be noted one of the key features that distinguished greenfield FDI from other
forms of foreign investment is the existence of set-up costs in such an operation, and because
of this in the theoretical literature fixed cost has traditionally played an important role (see,
for example, Horstmann and Markusen, 1987; and Motta, 1992). IJV also has a greenfield
component as IJV agreements are typically followed by significant capacity expansions by
the joint entity. Thus, significant reduction in the cost of such capacity expansion can be a
driving force in facilitating IJV agreements.
As an empirical fact, IJVs is still a major mode of foreign entry accounting for over a
third of FDI in 2003 (see Folta, 2005). This importance of IJVs has led to substantial aca-
demic literature on the subject. Das (1999) considers a setting where a risk-neutral MNC
and a risk-averse host firm make efforts to produce a good in a competitive market with cost
uncertainty. Sinha (2001) considers a dynamic setting where the host government imposes
a restriction on foreign equity holdings in the first period but removes the restriction in the
second period. Asiedu and Esfahani (2001), Chan and Hoy (1991) and Lin and Saggi (2004)
analyze the ownership structure of IJV where a MNC and a domestic firm possess comple-
mentary inputs. In Chan and Hoy (1991) and Lin and Saggi (2004), firms cannot directly
contract on their inputs, and they provide inputs non-cooperatively based on the profit-
1we shall use therms set-up costs and fixed costs interchangeably.
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sharing arrangement. Svejnar and Smith (1984) examine the microeconomic behavior of
joint ventures established between MNCs and domestic partners in less developed countries,
focusing on the role of bargain power, transfer pricing, stock ownership and profit shares
of the parties, and the responsiveness of IJVs to national development goals.2 Darrough
and Stoughton (1989) analyze the profit-sharing arrangement in joint ventures as a Bayesian
bargaining game between two parents with incomplete information about each other’s cost
functions. Lee (2004) studies the foreign equity share of international joint ventures in a set-
ting where a MNC and a domestic firm simultaneously decide their respective equity share
and the time to exercise an irreversible investment project via Nash-bargaining. Dai and
Lahiri (2007) analyze IJV in a principal-agent framework with demand uncertainty, with the
domestic firm having advantage in information gathering and the foreign firm having a cost
advantage.
In contrast to the above literature, in the present paper the endogeneity of set-up
costs in the IJV plays an important role. In particular, we assume that the domestic firm
can, with some efforts, reduce set-up costs and the MNC has advantages in costs and in
gathering information on demand uncertainty. With this, our principal-agent analysis with
double-sided moral hazards allows us to examine conditions under which it is in the interest
of both parties to form an IJV and when it is not. To be more specific, we examine how the
MNC’s preference for, and the ownership structure of, a joint venture depend on the efficiency
of information gathering and cost reduction, and the nature of technology transfer. We also
examine if credit market conditions can affect the nature of the contract and find, inter alia,
that under severe credit constraints the principal (the MNC) will not drive the domestic
firm’s profits to its reservation level (which is also endogenous in our analysis).3 One of our
surprising findings is that a relaxation of the credit constraint facing the domestic firm never
2Welfare implications of, and government policies toward, JVs are analyzed in, for example, Farge and
Wells, 1982; Katrak, 1983; Al-Saadon and Das, 1996; Roy Chowdhury and Roy Chowdhury, 2002; Das and
Katayama, 2003; and Tomoda and Kurata, 2004.
3Our analysis also relates to several studies on the value of information in agency problems. See. for
example, Sobel (1993), Lewis and Sappington (1994), Lewis and Sappington (1997), Cremer et al. (1998),
and Dai et al. (2006).
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makes it better off and in fact makes the domestic firm worse off when the credit constraint
is severe.
Our framework in which the MNC has an advantage in gathering information on
demand uncertainty implicitly assumes that the product of the IJV is mostly sold in a
foreign market. In other words, IJV in our paper is an export-oriented (or, export platform)
one. This type of FDI is not uncommon in reality.4 For example, many US firms invest
in Ireland and export their product to the rest of European Union member countries (see,
for example Barry and Bradly (1997)). Japanese investments in the UK also produce goods
mainly for the EU market. According to UNCTAD, foreign affiliate exports now make up
about one-third of total world exports (UNCTAD, 1998).
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the central
elements of our model. Section 3 discusses the benchmark case of duopoly competition.
Whereas section 4 analyzes the IJV equilibrium when the credit market is perfect, in section
5 we allow for credit market imperfections. Some concluding remarks are made in section 6.
2 Technology and Information
In our model, we consider the production of a homogeneous commodity in a country called
the host country, and the entire production is sold in a foreign market. There is a domestic
and a foreign firm in the host country. We shall call these two firms firm D and the MNC
respectively. These two firms either compete as duopolists for the foreign market or they
form a joint venture.
The inverse demand function for the product is given by
p = a˜− bq,
4see Ekholm et al. (2007) for a recent study of export-platform FDI.
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where the demand parameter a˜ is a binary random variable defined as:
a˜ =

a0 with probability φ
a1 with probability 1− φ.
(1)
Without loss of generality, we assume that a0 < a1.
Both firms are risk neutral. At the beginning of each period, both the MNC and the
domestic firm know the distribution of a˜. However, the MNC has an information advantage
in the sense that with efforts it can gather information to update its knowledge on a˜ before
production actually takes place. To be more specific, if the MNC puts in an effort level of
em, with probability µ(em) = αem, it discovers the realization of a˜; but, with probability
1 − µ(em), it obtains no further information on a˜. The parameter α measures the MNC’s
efficiency in gathering information. The cost of the MNC’s information gathering is e2m/2.
The MNC also has a technology advantage in the sense that its constant marginal cost cm
is lower than that of the domestic firm which is denoted by cd, i.e., cm < cd.
The MNC’s set-up cost of production in the developing country is F . However, in
a joint venture, the domestic firm can reduce the set-up cost of production with effort, ed.
Therefore, the set-up cost for a joint venture is F − βed, where β is a parameter measuring
the domestic firm’s effectiveness in cost reduction. The cost of the domestic firm’s effort is
e2d/2.
Each firm’s effort is not observable to the other firm and is a private information.
Having described the overall framework in relation to asymmetry in information, we
shall now describe the benchmark case of duopoly competition between the two firms, which
will materialize if a joint venture arrangement cannot be agreed upon by the two parties.
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3 The Benchmark: Duopoly Competition
Suppose the two firms engage in a two-stage Cournot competition. In the first stage, the
MNC gathers demand information, and then in the second stage, the two firms compete on
outputs, given their information on the demand condition.
In order to obtain a sub-game perfect equilibrium, we work with backward induction,
starting with the second stage. In the second stage, the MNC’s output strategy depends on
its information on the demand parameter. First, when it fails to discover the realization of
the demand parameter which has a probability of 1 − µ(em), it makes its output decision
based upon its prior belief on a˜ and on the domestic firm’s output strategy. In this case, the
MNC’s optimization problem is the following:
Max pim
qm
= [a− b(qm + qd)− cm] qm − F , (2)
where a = E[a˜] = φa0+ (1− φ)a1, and qm and qd are the output levels of the MNC and the
domestic firm respectively. This optimization problem gives us the MNC’s optimal output
response function as qm = (a− bqd − cm)/(2b).
Second, when the MNC discovers the realization of a˜ which has a probability of µ(em),
its optimization problem is the following:
Max pidi
qim
=
[
ai − b(qim + qd)− cm
]
qim − F , (3)
where i = 0, 1 denotes the realization of the demand parameter – a0 and a1 respectively.
In this case, the domestic firm’s optimal output response is qim = (ai − bqd − cm)/(2b) for
i = 0, 1.
The domestic firm chooses an output level to maximize its expected profits based
upon its prior belief on a˜ and on the MNC’s output strategy. In particular, its optimization
problem is the following:
Max pid
qd
= {a− b[qd + (1− µ(em))qm + µ(em)(φq0m + (1− φ)q1m)]− cd}qd, (4)
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where (1− µ(em))qm + µ(em)(φq0m + (1− φ)q1m) is the expected value of the MNC’s output.
Consequently, the domestic firm’s optimal output response is qd = {a − b[(1 −
µ(em))qm + µ(em)(φq
0
m + (1− φ)q1m)]− cd}/(2b).
Therefore, at the equilibrium, both firms’ output levels (under different scenarios) are
the following:
qm =
a− 2cm + cd
3b
, (5)
q0m =
3a0 − a− 4cm + 2cd
6b
, (6)
q1m =
3a1 − a− 4cm + 2cd
6b
, and (7)
qd =
a− 2cd + cm
3b
. (8)
At the equilibrium, both firms’ outputs increase in (expected) demand condition (a)
and their competitors’ marginal costs, but decrease in their own marginal costs. The MNC’s
output depends on the expected demand condition when it fails to discover the demand
condition, but varies with the demand condition when it successfully discovers the demand
condition. For simplicity, we assume cd 6 (a+cm)/2 and cm 6 (3a0−a+2cd)/4 so that both
firms will produce positive amounts of the good under all demand conditions. Formally,
Assumption 1 cd 6 (a+ cm)/2 and cm 6 (3a0 − a+ 2cd)/4.
The MNC’s equilibrium profits depend on its information and the demand conditions.
First, when it fails to discover the demand condition, its expected equilibrium profit is
pim =
(a− 2cm + cd)2
9b
− F. (9)
Second, when it discovers the realization of demand parameter to be a˜ = a0, its profit is
pi0m =
(3a0 − a− 4cm + 2cd)2
36b
− F, (10)
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and finally when it discovers the realization of demand parameter to be a˜ = a1, its profit is:
pi1m =
(3a1 − a− 4cm + 2cd)2
36b
− F. (11)
The expected equilibrium profit for the domestic firm is
pid =
(a− 2cd + cm)2
9b
. (12)
This completes the description of the second stage. In the first stage, the MNC
chooses its effort level in information gathering based upon its expectation of equilibrium
profits in the second stage.
The MNC’s optimization problem is as follows:
Max
em
pim = µ(em)(φpi
0
m + (1− φ)pi1m) + (1− µ(em))pim − e2m/2, (13)
where pim, pi
0
m and pi
1
m are given in (9), (10) and (11) respectively and µ(em) = αem.
The solution of the optimal level of effort in the above problem is given by:
em =
αVar(a˜)
4b
, where (14)
Var(a˜) = φa20 + (1− φ)a21 − a2.
We define the value of information, V , as the difference between the MNC’s profits
when information gathering is successful and when it is unsuccessful. Hence,
V = (φpim0 + (1− φ)pim1)− pim = Var(a˜)/(4b). (15)
The MNC’s maximum profit under duopoly competition, therefore, is
pim = pim + α
2[φa20 + (1− φ)a21 − a2]2/(32b2),
or, pim = pim + α
2V 2/2. (16)
Therefore, the benefit of the MNC’s superior information on demand condition is increasing
in α and Var(a˜).
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Proposition 1 Under duopoly competition, the MNC’s expected profit increases as the de-
mand condition becomes more uncertain or the firm becomes more efficient in gathering
information; however, the domestic firm’s expected profit depends on neither the demand
uncertainty nor the MNC’s ability to gather information.
The intuition is as follows. The MNC’s information on demand condition enables
it to adjust its output downward when demand is low and upward when demand is high.
However, the MNC’s gain in profit when the demand is high more than compensates its loss
in profit when demand is low because of the volume effect on profits. Therefore, the MNC’s
expected profit increases as the demand becomes more uncertain. Turning to the effect of
efficiency in information gathering, the MNC obtains the demand information more often
for any given level of effort as it becomes more efficient in gathering information, and this
increases its expected profit. However, the domestic firm’s output decision is based purely on
its expectation of demand condition and therefore its profits is not affected by the variability
of demand condition, but is increasing in the expected value of demand condition.
As for the effect of the MNC’s efficiency level in information gathering, it has two
opposing effects on the domestic firm’s expected profits: the MNC softens the competition
by reducing output when demand is low and toughens the competition by raising output
when demand is high. These two opposing effects turn out to offset each other. Moreover, as
the demand uncertainty increases, so does the magnitude of these two effects. Consequently,
the demand uncertainty and the MNC’s efficiency in information gathering have no effect
on the domestic firm’s expected profit.5
5Basar and Ho (1976), Ponssard (1979), Novshek and Sonnenschein (1982), Vives (1984), and Hwang
(1993) study firms’ incentives to acquire and disclose information on the demand function in an oligopolistic
market. They show that the acquisition of such information is always beneficial to the firms and not disclosing
information is a dominant strategy for each firm in Cournot competition when the goods are substitutes.
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4 Joint Venture
Having described the benchmark duopoly equilibrium, we are now in a position to develop
the international joint venture (IJV) equilibrium. We shall set it up in a principal-agent
framework, with the MNC being the principal and the domestic firm as the agent.
As for the technology, we assume that in the joint venture, the marginal cost of
production is a linear combination of the MNC’s and the domestic firm’s original marginal
costs, i.e.,
cj = θcm + (1− θ)cd,
where θ ∈ [0, 1] measures the efficiency of technology transfer. The set-up cost of the joint
venture is F − βed where ed is the effort level of the domestic firm in reducing the set-up
cost and the positive parameter β represents the efficiency of a given amount of effort in
reducing the set-up cost.
The MNC continues, as in the benchmark case, to spend resources in information
gathering. Since each firm’s effort is unobservable to the other firm, the two firms cannot
contract on either the domestic firm’s effort in cost reduction or the MNC’s effort in informa-
tion gathering. Consequently, the IJV is subjected to a double-sided moral hazard problem,
and the optimal contract must induce both firms’ effort supply in the IJV.
The timing of the model is as follows:
1. The MNC offers a contract {T, s} to the domestic firm, specifying the domestic firm’s
lump-sum payment to the MNC T (which can be negative) and the MNC’s share of
profit s.
2. The domestic firm decides whether to accept or reject the contract.
3. The nature determines the demand condition in the market.
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4. The MNC gathers information on demand conditions, and the domestic firm engages
in cost reduction.
5. The IJV determines the output level and production takes place.
6. Profits of the IJV are distributed between the two parties based on the contract.
The optimization problem for the IJV depends whether the MNC succeeds or fails to
discover the demand condition. When the MNC fails to discover the demand condition, the
IJV’s optimization problem, at stage 5 of the game, is
Max
qj
pij = (a− bqj + cj)qj − (F − βed), (17)
and in this case it can be shown that the join venture’s maximum profit is pij = (a −
cj)
2/(4b)− (F − βed). The subscript j stands for IJV.
When the MNC discovers the realization of the demand condition, the IJV’s opti-
mization problem is
Max piij
qij
=
[
ai − bqij − cj
]
qij − (F − βed), (18)
where i = 0, 1. In this case, the joint venture’s maximum profit is pi0j = (a0 − cj)2/(4b) −
(F − βed) if a˜ = a0, and pi1j = (a1 − cj)2/(4b)− (F − βed) if a˜ = a1.
Before describing the optimal contract, we shall first of all, describe the first-best
solution in which the firms can observe each other’s effort levels and thus contract on it.
4.1 The first-best solution
As a reference point, we first consider the optimal solution when the firms can observe and
contract on their effort. In this case, the IJV can specify both the domestic firm’s effort in
cost reduction and the MNC’s effort in information gathering in the contract. The MNC’s
10
optimization problem is
Max Πm
T,s,em,ed
= s[µ(em)(φR
0
j + (1− φ)R1j ) + (1− µ(em))Rj − (F − βed)] + T (19)
subject to
(1− s)[µ(em)(φR0j + (1− φ)R1j ) + (1− µ(em))Rj − (F − βed)]− T − e2d/2 > pid, (20)
where Rj = (a − cj)2/(4b), R0j = (a0 − cj)2/(4b), R1j = (a1 − cj)2/(4b), and pid is defined in
(12).
Constraint (20), which requires the domestic firm’s expected profits in the IJV to
be no less than its maximum expected profit under duopoly competition, guarantees the
domestic firm’s participation in the IJV.
In the optimal solution we must have:
e∗m = α[(φR
0
j + (1− φ)R1j )−Rj] = αV , and (21)
e∗d = β. (22)
The MNC offers the domestic firm a combination of s and T which drives the latter’s
profit to its reservation level. Substituting T from (20) (with equality) into (19) and using
(21), we can obtain the MNC’s maximum profits to be Rj +µ(e
∗)[(φR0j + (1−φ)R1j )−Rj] +
α2V 2/2− (F − β2/2)− pid = Rj +α2V 2/2− (F − β2/2)− pid. Thus, the domestic firm’s and
the MNC’s profits, respectively, are
Π∗d = pid, and (23)
Π∗m = Rj + α
2V 2/2− (F − β2/2)− pid. (24)
Note that total IJV profit in this case is Rj+µ(e
∗)[(φR0j +(1−φ)R1j )−Rj]+α2V 2/2−
(F − β2/2), of which α2V 2/2 is the contribution of the MNC via information gathering and
β2/2 is the contribution of the domestic firm via fixed-cost reduction.
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4.2 The Optimal Contract
Having described the first best, we now describe the optimal contract when the firms can-
not contract on either the domestic firm’s effort in cost reduction or the MNC’s effort in
information gathering. We conduct the analysis again with backward induction.
First, since the firms cannot observe each other’s effort supply, each firm chooses its
effort level by maximizing its own profit based on its share of profits as specified in the
contract.
Given its share of profit, 1− s, the domestic firm’s optimization problem is
Max
ed
(1− s)[µ(em)(φR0j + (1− φ)R1j ) + (1− µ(em))Rj − (F − βed)]− T − e2d/2. (25)
Then the domestic firm’s cost-reduction effort given its share is
ed = (1− s)β. (26)
Given its share of profit, s, the MNC’s optimization problem is
Max
em
Πm = s[µ(em)(φR
0
j + (1− φ)R1j ) + (1− µ(em))Rj − (F − βed)] + T − e2m/2. (27)
Then the MNC’s information gathering effort given its share is
em = sαV . (28)
In the first stage, the MNC chooses a contract {T, s} to maximize its profit based on
its anticipation of each firm’s effort supply in the later stage described above. Therefore, the
MNC’s optimization problem in the first stage is
Max
s,T
Πm = s[µ(em)(φR
0
j + (1− φ)R1j ) + (1− µ(em))Rj − (F − βed)] + T − e2m/2. (29)
subject to constraints (20), (26), and (28).
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Constraint (20) guarantees the domestic firm’s participation in the IJV. Constraints
(26) and (28) determine the domestic firm’s effort in cost reduction and the MNC’s effort in
information gathering, respectively, for a given contract.
Substituting constraints (26) and(28) into the MNC’s optimization problem for ed
and em, the MNC’s optimization problem can be reduced to:
Max Πm
T,s
= s[Rj + sα
2V 2 − (F − (1− s)β2)] + T − s2α2V 2/2 (30)
subject to
(1− s)[Rj + sα2V 2 − (F − (1− s)β2)]− (1− s)2β2/2− T > pid. (31)
The solution to the MNC’s optimization problem is given by
s∗ =
α2V 2
α2V 2 + β2
; and (32)
T ∗ =
β2
α2V 2 + β2
(Rj − F ) + 2α
4V 4β2 + β6
2(α2V 2 + β2)2
− pid. (33)
Recall that α2V 2/2 and β2/2, respectively, are the domestic firm’s and the MNC’s
contributions via their respective effort levels to the joint venture’s profit in the first-best
solution. Thus, in the optimal contract, each firm’s share of profit equals its relative ability to
increase the joint venture’s profit. Since 0 < s < 1 in the optimal contract, from constraints
(26) and(28) it follows that both firms supply less than their first-best level of efforts. The
MNC also charges a lump-sum payment in the optimal contract. Notice that the payment
becomes negative as β converges to zero, i.e., as the domestic firm’s ability to reduce the
set-up cost diminishes. That is, when the domestic firm does not contribute anything to the
IJV’s profits, it does not receive any share of profits but only a lump-sum transfer from the
MNC. This is because in this case the MNC has nothing to gain by giving the domestic firm
a higher share of profits and thus inducing it to exert more efforts.
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Under the optimal contract, the MNC’s and the domestic firm’s profits in this case
are respectively:
Πm = Rj +
β4 + α2V 2β2 + α4V 4
2(α2V 2 + β2)
− F − pid, and (34)
Πd = pid. (35)
Therefore, under the optimal contract, the domestic firm always receives its reserva-
tion profits—its profits under duopoly competition. We summarize these properties of the
optimal contract in Proposition 2 (the formal proof is given in appendix A).
Proposition 2 In the optimal contract, each firm receives a share of the joint venture which
equals its relative ability to increase the joint venture’s profit. Consequently, both firms deliver
less than the first-best level of effort. The MNC charges a lump-sum payment (which can be
negative), and the domestic firm always receives its reservation profit.
As the domestic firm’s ability to reduce the set-up cost increases, the profit of the joint
venture increases but the domestic firm’s reservation profit remains the same. Therefore,
the MNC’s profit increases as the domestic firm becomes more effective in cost reduction.
Moreover, the MNC’s profit also increases as the MNC’s ability to gather information—
represented by α—increases. We summarize these results in Proposition 3
Proposition 3 The MNC’s profit in the joint venture increases as either the MNC’s ability
to gather information or the domestic firm’s ability to reduce set-up cost increases.
The MNC however may not take part in the IJV if its profits under IJV is lower than
that under duopoly. On one hand, the formation of a joint venture eliminates competition
and reduces set-up costs. On the other hand, the double-sided moral hazard problem in
the joint venture leads to inefficient effort supply by both firms. In Proposition 3 we show
that, when the technology transfer is perfect, i.e., θ = 1, the the effect of reductions in both
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competition and set-up cost always dominates the effect of inefficiency of effort supply in
the joint venture. Consequently, the MNC would always prefer IJV to duopoly when the
technology transfer is perfect (appendix B has the proof). Formally:
Proposition 4 When the technology transfer is perfect, the MNC always prefers a joint
venture to duopoly competition.
Next we derive a sufficient condition on the domestic firm’s ability to reduce set-up
cost under which the MNC would still prefer IJV over duopoly even when technology transfer
is completely absent, i.e., θ = 0. This sufficient condition also guarantees that IJV is the
preferred option for the MNC for all values of θ. However, if this sufficient condition is not
satisfied, then there exists a critical value of cd, say c˜d, such IJV is preferable to the MNC if
cd ≤ c˜d, and duopoly can be preferable if c˜d ≤ cd (≤ (a+ cm)/2), because of assumption (1).
These results are formally stated in proposition 4 below (the proof is given in appendix C).
Proposition 5 When the technology transfer is imperfect, there exists a critical value of
β, β˜, such that the MNC prefers IJV to duopoly for all values of θ if β > β˜. The critical
value β˜ is an increasing function of α2V 2. If β < β˜, then there exists a critical value of
cd, c˜d(≤ (a + cm)/2), such that the MNC prefers IJV to duopoly when cd < c˜d, and duopoly
to IJV when c˜d ≤ cd. Furthermore, the critical value c˜d is an increasing function of the
technology transfer parameter θ.
The intuition behind Propositions 4 is as follows. When the technology transfer is
imperfect, the MNC faces the trade-off between reductions in both competition and set-
up costs on one hand, and the inefficiency in effort supplies and differences in production
technology on the other. When the domestic firm’s production technology becomes more
inefficient (i.e., its marginal cost increases), the MNC’s profit under duopoly competition
increases, but its profit in the IJV decreases as the IJV’s marginal cost of production in-
creases. Consequently, the MNC’s benefit from less competition decreases as the domestic
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firm’s production technology becomes less efficient. Therefore, the MNC prefers IJV to duo-
poly competition only if the domestic firm’s ability to reduce set-up cost is sufficiently large
relative to the MNC’s ability to gather information. When the domestic firm’s production
technology is sufficiently inferior and its ability to reduce set-up cost is minimal, the MNC
prefers duopoly competition to IJV.
Notice that the MNC’s original set-up cost of production, F , has no effect the MNC’s
preference for IJV, as it influences the MNC’s profits under both the IJV and duopoly
competition equally.
5 Imperfect Credit Market
In the preceding analysis, we implicitly assumed that the domestic firm can finance the ex
ante payment — which is needed before profits are realized and distributed — by borrowing
the amount from the credit market. There is no problem with this if the credit market is
perfect. However, in reality credit markets are often imperfect putting restriction on the
amount of lump-sum ex ante transfer. In this section we assume the existence of such a
restriction, and denote by W the maximum amount that the domestic firm can borrow.In
this case the MNC may not be able to charge the domestic firm the same amount of ex ante
payment as in the case of perfect credit market.
When W > T ∗ (T ∗ is the equilibrium level of payment in the previous analysis
(defined in equation (33)), i.e., the credit constraint is not binding, then nothing changes
and previous analysis holds. However, when W < T ∗, the domestic firm’s ex ante payment is
constrained by its access to credit, and the MNC can no longer charge the domestic firm the
same amount of ex ante payment as in the case of perfect credit market. Since the inability
to use lump-sum transfer constrains the MNC’s ability to extract the domestic firm’s profit,
it has implications for the participation constraint (31). Consequently two sub-cases arise
depending on the extent of the credit constraint. If the credit constraint is binding but not
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severely so, the MNC would be able to use a combination of the two instruments — a lump-
sum ex ante transfer T (to the extent allowed) and profit share s — to drive the domestic
firm’s profits to the reservation level pid. However, when the credit constraint is severe and
the ability of the MNC to charge a lump-sum transfer is very limited, the MNC will choose
not to drive the domestic firm’s profit to the reservation level. We shall consider these two
cases in turn. The critical level of W , W , at which credit constraint becomes severe from
being moderate is given by
W =
[β2 − α2V 2 − (Rj − F )][β2 + α2V 2 + 3(Rj − F )]β2
2(2β2 − α2V 2)2 − pid, (36)
and (31) becomes non-binding when W < W .6
For simplicity, in this section we shall assume that the joint venture’s profit is nonneg-
ative when neither information gathering nor fixed-cost reduction is feasible, i.e., Rj−F > 0.
5.1 The case of moderate credit constraint: T ∗ > W > W
In this case, the domestic firm’s access to moderate amount of credit allows the MNC to
drive the domestic firm’s profit to its reservation level. Under the optimal contract,
T = W , (37)
and the MNC’s share of profit, S, is determined by
(1− s)[Rj + sα2V 2 − F + (1− s)β2/2]−W = pid. (38)
From equation (38) it can be derived that ds/dW = −1/[Rj + (2s − 1)α2V 2 − F +
(1 − s)β2], and this can be shown to be negative using (38). That is, the domestic firm’s
share of profit increases as its access to credit increases, when Rj > F .
6Note that the critical value of W depends on β among other things, and if the value of β relatively small
so that β2 < α2V 2 + (Rj − F ), the critical value of W is negative and the case of severe credit constraint
cannot arise.
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When the domestic firm’s ability to deliver the lump sum payment T is limited by its
credit constraint, the MNC has to rely on the share of profits S to extract the domestic firm’s
profit, which dilutes the domestic firm’s incentive to provide cost-reduction effort. Therefore,
the MNC faces a tradeoff between profit extraction and incentive provision. As the domestic
firm’s access to credit increases, the MNC can charge a larger ex ante payment, so the MNC
is willing to offer the domestic firm a larger share to induce its effort supply. Consequently,
the joint venture’s profit and the MNC’s profit in the joint venture both increase as the
domestic firm’s access to credit increases. We summarize the properties of optimal contract
in this case in Proposition 6.
Proposition 6 When T ∗ > W > W and Rj > F, the domestic firm’s share of profit
increases as its access to credit increases. Moreover, the joint venture’s and the MNC’s
profit both increase as the domestic firm’s access to credit increases. However, the domestic
firm always receives its reservation profit.
When the credit market is imperfect, the MNC receives a smaller profit than that in
a perfect credit market. However, when the technology transfer is perfect, i.e., θ = 1, it can
be shown that the reduction in both the competition and set-up costs still dominates the
inefficiency of effort supply in the joint venture. Consequently, the MNC always prefers IJV
to duopoly when the technology transfer is perfect (appendix F has the proof).
Proposition 7 When the technology transfer is perfect, the MNC always prefers a joint
venture to duopoly competition even if the credit market is imperfect.
5.2 The case of severe credit constraint: W < W
In this case, the domestic firm’s ability to make the ex ante payment is severely constrained
by its access to credit, and therefore the participation constraint (31) is not binding. The
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optimal contract is given by
s =
Rj − F + β2
2β2 − α2V 2 ; and (39)
T = W. (40)
Note that this case arises only if β2 > α2V 2 + Rj − F , i.e., the domestic firm is
sufficiently efficient in cost reduction. Given the domestic firm’s high efficiency in cost
reduction, in the optimal contract the MNC offers the domestic firm a large share of profit
to induce its effort supply in cost reduction. The share optimally balances the MNC’s share
of profit and the domestic firm’s incentive to reduce set-up cost. Constrained by the domestic
firm’s access to credit, the ex ante payment is too small to limit the domestic firm’s profit to
its reservation level. Consequently, the domestic firm receives a profit above its reservation
level.
From equation (39), ds/dα2 > 0, i.e., the MNC’s share of profits increases as its
ability to gather information increases. Moreover,
ds
dβ2
= −2(Rj +
α2V 2
2
− F )
2β2 − α2V 2 , (41)
which suggests ds/dβ2 < 0 when Rj > F . Therefore, the domestic firm’s share of profit
increases as its ability to reduce set-up cost increases.
As the domestic firm’s access to credit W increases, on one hand, the lump sum
payment T increases; on the other hand, the domestic firm’s share of profit does not change
as indicated by equation (39). Consequently, the MNC’s profit increases but the domestic
firm’s profit surprisingly decreases as the domestic firm’s access to credit increases.
We summarize the properties of optimal contract in this case in Proposition 8.
Proposition 8 When W < W ∗ and Rj > F , the MNC’s share of profit increases as its
ability to gather information increases, and the domestic firm’s share profit increases as its
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ability to reduce set-up cost increases. The MNC’s profit increases but the domestic firm’s
profit decreases as the domestic firm’s access to credit increases. Moreover, the domestic
firm’s profit in the joint venture is always above its reservation level.
6 Conclusion
Foreign direct investment (FDI) in general, and international joint venture (IJV) in par-
ticular, can take place for a variety of reasons and the nature of the contract between the
partners in an IJV is likely to reflect the underlying incentives and motives. Set-up costs
are thought to be an integral part of all type of FDI, and in this paper reducing these costs
— which the domestic partner can do with some efforts — is an important motivation for a
multinational corporation (MNC) to prefer IJV over purely greenfield investments.
We develop a principal-agent model of IJV in which the MNC is the principal and it
has an advantage over its domestic partner in gathering information on uncertain demand.
The principal offers a contract to its potential domestic partner, making sure that the latter
receives at least as much income from the IJV as it can if it competes with the MNC in
a duopoly competition. We find that there are circumstances where the MNC may prefer
duopoly to IJV. This possibility arises only when the IJV technology is inferior to the MNC
technology, or in other words technology transfer in the IJV is imperfect. We also find
that the the contract involves a positive share of IJV profits for both parties as long as the
domestic firm has some advantage in fixed-cost reduction. It also involves an ex ante lump-
sum transfer from the domestic firm to the MNC if the domestic firm is sufficiently efficient
in reducing set-up costs. In the latter situation, the domestic firm can receive an income
which is higher than its reservation income if imperfections in credit market are severe. In
other words, the domestic firm is worse off when the credit constraint facing it improves
from being severe to moderate or no constraint. We also find that a relaxation of the credit
constraint facing the domestic firm never makes it better off and in fact makes the domestic
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firm worse off when the credit constraint is severe.
Our contribution to this expanding literature can shed some light on some stylished
facts. For example, in 1995 IJVs accounted for 70.45% of total FDI. This figure has gone
down to 35.8% in 2003. Some of this fall can be explained by changes in policy toward FDI
in countries such as China and India. However, some of it can also be explained by the fact
that globalization has also resulted in advances in information technology, and therefore the
specific advantages of joining on IJV such as cost-reducing advantage, information gathering
advantage etc. are no longer as significant as it used to be. Furthermore, advances in
credit facilities can also, according to our analysis, dampen the enthusiasm of the potential
domestic partners of an IJV.
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Appendix A: Proof of Proposition 2
The Lagrangian of the MNC’s problem is the following:
£ = s[Rj + sα
2V 2 − (F − (1− s)β2)] + T − s2α2V 2/2 +
λ1{(1− s)[Rj + sα2V 2 − (F − (1− s)β2)]− (1− s)2β2/2− T − pid}, (A.1)
where λ1 is the Lagrangian multiplier for constraint (31). Then the first order conditions are
the following:
£s = [Rj+sα
2V 2−F +(1−2s)β2)]+λ1[(1−2s)α2V 2−Rj+F −(1−s)β2)] = 0, and (A.2)
£T = 1− λ1 = 0. (A.3)
Equation (A.3) indicates that λ1 = 1. Then solving (A.2) we get
s =
α2V 2
α2V 2 + β2
. (A.4)
From constraint (31), we also find that
T =
β2
α2V 2 + β2
(Rj − F ) + 2α
4V 4β2 + β6
2(α2V 2 + β2)2
− pid. (A.5)
.
Appendix B: Proof of Proposition 3
The MNC strictly prefers joint venture to duopoly competition if
Πm > pim, or (B.1)
(a− cj)2
4b
+
2α4V 4β2 + β6 − β4α2V 2
2(α2V 2 + β2)2
>
(a− 2cm + cd)2
9b
+
(a− 2cd + cm)2
9b
. (B.2)
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Since
2α4V 4β2 + β6 − β4α2V 2
2(α2V 2 + β2)2
=
β2
[
(β2 −√2α2V 2)2 + (2√2− 1)β2α2V 2]
2(α2V 2 + β2)2
(B.3)
> 0, (B.4)
a sufficient condition for condition (B.6) is
(a− cj)2
4b
>
(a− 2cm + cd)2
9b
+
(a− 2cd + cm)2
9b
. (B.5)
When the technology transfer is perfect, cj = cm and the above condition simplifies
to
(a− cm)2
4
>
(a− 2cm + cd)2 + (a− 2cd + cm)2
9
. (B.6)
Define ϕ(cd) ≡ [(a−2cm+cd)2 +(a−2cd+cm)2]/9. Since ϕ′(cd) = (10cd−2a−8cm)/9
and ϕ′′(cd) ≡ 10/9 > 0, ϕ(cd) is strictly convex in cd and is U-shaped. Furthermore,
ϕ′|cd=cm = 2(cd − a)/9 < 0 and ϕ|cd=cm = 2(a− cm)2/9 < (a− cm)2/4. Thus, the inequality
(B.6) is satisfied at cd = cm.
It can also be shown that, ϕ′|cd=(a+cm)/2 = (a − cm)/3 > 0 and ϕ|cd=(a+cm)/2 =
(a−cm)2/4, which is the left hand side of (B.6). However, from assumption 1 , we have cm <
cd < (a+ cm)/2. Thus from the shape of the ϕ(cd) function it follows that ϕ < (a− cm)2/4
for all cd ∈ [cm, (a+ cm)/2]. 2
Appendix C: Proof of Proposition 4
Define φ(cd) ≡ (a−2cm+cd)2/9+(a−2cd+cm)2/9−(a−cj)2/4−β4/2(α2V 2+β2). Following
the proof of proposition 3, it follows from (B.5) that the MNC would prefer IJV to duopoly
competition if and only if φ(cd) < 0.
It is easy to verify that
φ(cd)|cd=cm = −(a− cm)2/36− [2α4V 4β2 + β6 − β2α2V 2]/2(α2V 2 + β2)2 < 0.
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Moreover, the function also has the following property:
18φ′(cd) = [−4 + 9(1− θ)]a− [16 + 9θ(1− θ)]cm + [20− 9(1− θ)]cd, (C.1)
18φ′′(cd) = [20− 9(1− θ)] > 0. (C.2)
Thus, the function φ(cd) is strictly convex and is either monotonically increasing or
U-shaped. Moreover, since the maximum possible value for cd is (3a0 − a + 2cm)/4 and an
increase in the value of θ decreases the value of φ(cd) for every level of cd, if we can show
that φ(cd)|cd=(3a0−a+2cm)/4, θ=0 < 0, then φ < 0 for all admissible values of θ and cd and we
can say that the MNC will always prefer IJV to duopoly competition. In fact, we have
φ(cd)|cd=(a+cm)/2, θ=0 =
3(a− cm)2
16
− β
4
2(α2V 2 + β2)
(C.3)
From equation (C.3), there exists a value of β, β˜, such that φ(cd)|cd=(a+cm)/2, θ=0 <
0 when β > β˜ but φ(cd)|cd=(a+cm)/2, θ=0 > 0 when β < β˜. Further, β˜ is increasing in
3(a − cm)2/16 and α2V 2. Therefore, the condition β > β˜ is a sufficient condition for the
MNC to prefer IJV over duopoly competition always. If β < β˜, then by continuity, there
must a critical value of cd, c˜d, such that IJV is preferable to the MNC if cd ≤ c˜d, and
duopoly is preferable if c˜d ≤ cd ≤ (a + cm)/2. Moreover, since φ(cd) decreases with θ for
every cd, c˜d increases with θ and as θ is sufficiently large c˜d becomes inadmissible (greater
than (a+ cm)/2). 2
7 Appendix D: Proof of Proposition 6
The MNC’s maximization problem is (30) subject to constraints (31) and the credit con-
straint, T < W . Therefore, the Lagrangian of the MNC’s problem is the following:
£ = s[Rj + sα
2V 2 − (F − (1− s)β2)] + T − s2α2V 2/2 + λ2{W − T}
λ1{(1− s)[Rj + sα2V 2 − (F − (1− s)β2)]− (1− s)2β2/2− T − pid}, (D.1)
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where λ2 is the Lagrangian multiplier for the credit constraint. Then the first order conditions
are the following:
£s = [Rj+sα
2V 2−F +(1−2s)β2)]+λ1[(1−2s)α2V 2−Rj+F −(1−s)β2)] = 0, and (D.2)
£T = 1− λ1 − λ2 = 0. (D.3)
When λ1 = 0, λ2 = 1 from equation (D.3), which implies T = W . From equation
(D.2),
s =
Rj − F + β2
2β2 − α2V 2 . (D.4)
From equation (D.4), s 6 1 requires β2 > α2V 2+Rj−F . From constraint (31), λ1 = 0
requires W < W . Further, d£/dW = λ2 = 1 suggests that the MNC’s profit increases as W
increases.
8 Appendix E: Proof of Proposition 7
From Appendix D, when λ1 > 0 and λ2 > 0, both the credit constraint and constraint (31)
are binding binding, i.e., T = W and
(1− s)[Rj + sα2V 2 − (F − (1− s)β2)]− (1− s)2β2/2−W = pid. (E.1)
Equation (E.1) determines the MNC’s optimal share of profit in this case. The fact λ1 > 0
and λ2 > 0 requires T
∗ > W > W .
Differentiation of equation (E.1) provides
ds
dW
= − 1
Rj + (2s− 1)α2V 2 − F + (1− s)β2
. (E.2)
It can shown that ds/dW > 0 when s = α2V 2/(β2 + α2V 2) and s = (Rj − F +
β2)/(2β2−α2V 2). Further, Rj + (2s− 1)α2V 2−F + (1− s)β2 is monotone in s. Therefore,
ds/dW > 0 always holds.
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9 Appendix F: Proof of Proposition 8
We consider the MNC’s preference for IJV for a given contract–{s = 1, T = −pid}. It can be
easily verified that the proposed contract satisfies all constraints. Notice that the proposed
contract provides a lower bound of the MNC’s profit from the joint venture, because it is
implementable but may not be optimal.
The MNC prefers the proposed contract to duopoly competition if
[Rj + α
2V 2 − F ]− α2V 2/2− pid > pim, or (F.1)
Rj > Rm +Rd.. (F.2)
Since Rj > Rm + Rd as shown in Appendix D, the MNC always prefers the pro-
posed joint venture contract to duopoly competition. Therefore, we can conclude that the
MNC always prefers a joint venture to duopoly competition even when the credit market is
imperfect.
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